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EDITORIAL NOTES
EXTENSION OF TERm OF OIL LEASE THROUGH DiscovRY OF OIL

IN LESS THAN PAYING QuANTTTixi.-In the syllabus of a recent

West Virginia case' it is stated that where an oil and gas lease is
for a term of one year and so long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from the demised premises, the language used will not limit
the lessee to the particular term mentioned in the lease, where he
has demonstrated that the land is underlaid -with oil or gas and
is proceeding with all diligence and in an efficient manner to produce oil or gas therefrom in paying quantities. After reading
the opinion one is far from sure that the language of the opinion
goes as far as that of the syllabus and that the court really intended this as one of the grounds of the decision. If it did so
intend (and such intent is indicated by the fact this point is
covered in the syllabus), then the case is in accord with and follows South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass2 in which the above doctrine
was first asserted. Whether the doctrine is sound is doubtful.
Both in the principal case and in South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass
the lease involved provided that the term should continue for a
fixed period and as long thereafter as oil or gas should be produced,
the words "in paying quantities" or language to that effect, which
is usually found in oil and gas leases, not being present. Since in
both cases some oil was discovered within the fixed term there
would have been justification for holding the lessee had complied
with the contract because the lease did not require oil or gas to
be produced in paying quantities in order to extend the term but
merely required that either oil or gas be produced. But South
Penn Oil Co. v. Sodgrass is not decided on this ground. Instead,
the court stated that "produced," "produced in paying quantities" and "found in paying quantities" must mean about the
same thing, and apparently held that though the lease would have
terminated on the expiration of the fixed term had not oil been
discovered (though admittedly not in paying quantities) yet the
mere discovery of oil, regardless as to quantity, vested in the
lessee the right to produce oil and gas from the leasehold, and that
the lessee by reason thereof had a right to make one more effort
to discover and produce oil or gas in paying quantities.
In the principal case the court, in commenting with approval
'Ohio Fuel Oil Co. v. Greenleaf, 99 S. E. 274 (1919).
1271 W. Va. 438, 76 S. E. 961 (1913). Contra, Murdock-West Co. v. Logan, 69 0.
St. 514, 69 N. E. 984 (1904).
See also Barnsdall v. Boley, 119 Fed. 191 (1902).
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on the South Penn Oil Case, says the rule is a rule of construction
and adds:
"It is not unreasonable to say that, when the parties made
such a contract as this contemplating the production of oil,
they had in view that by the happening of some untoward
event, or the failure of the lessee's expectations to be realized
within the time that might reasonably be expected, the lessee
might be delayed beyond the term of the lease in producing
oil or gas in paying quantities, but, if he was diligently and
efficiently prosecuting the work of development at the time
the particular term ended, according to the language of the
contract, and had therefore demonstrated that the land was
oil-producing land, the parties contemplated that he might
continue at least the operations in which he was then engaged to their completion, and if such operations resulted in
the production of oil in paying quantities, they would have
the same result under the other clause of the lease extending
it beyond the fixed term as though this result had been accomplished during such period."
The above language tacitly admits what is undoubtedly true, that
the term did end according to the usual meaning of the express
language of the contract and, if extended, must be extended by
implication. It follows that this doctrine must be based on the supposed intent of the parties at the time they executed the lease. It
therefore violates what has been taken to be a well-settled rule of
construction of oil and gas leases, namely, that the language
thereof is to be construed most strongly against the lessee.3 This
implication is contrary to the express language of the lease and is
in favor of the lessee.
The rule that the language of an oil and gas lease is to be taken
most strongly against the lessee probably is largely based on the
fact that the forms of these instruments are usually prepared
very carefully by skilled attorneys of the lessees and are therefore
apt to be worded so as to favor the lessees as much as possible,
and, though an oil and gas lease after it is executed appears to be
an instrument made by the lessor, yet in fact the language is the
language of the lessee which he persuaded the lessor to adopt. If
the lessee at the time the instrument was executed really contemsHugglns v,. Daley, 99 Fed. 606 (1900) ; Sbaffer v. Marks, 241 Fed. 139 (1917) ;
L'ettman v. Harness. 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896) ; Steelsmith v. Gartlin,
45 W. Va. 27, 29 S. E. 978 (l,98) ; Paraffine Oil Co. v. Cruce, 162 Pac. 716 (Okla.
1917).
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plated any such situation as arose in South Penn Oil Co. v.
Snodgrass or in the principal case, he would certainly have provided for it by express language, instead of leaving the matter to
a possible favorable implication in case a controversy should subsequently arise. Besides, it is not easy to see why parties executing a lease for a fixed term of ten years should contemplate any
such thing. It would seem that ten years would give the lessee
abundant time to test the premises for oil and gas if he so desired. Some untoward event might possibly have prevented a diligent lessee from producing oil in paying quantities in the principal case where the fixed term was only one year, but this is no
justification. for extending the term of the lease by implication
4
where there is a fixed term of ten years.
If the parties can reasonably be said to have contemplated a
possible extension of the term in order to permit the lessee at
least to finish any work of development in which he may be engaged at the time the fixed term expires, it would seem they would
contemplate this regardless as to whether the lessee had found a
trace of oil or gas within the fixed term. Apparently, in order to
benefit by such implication, the lessee must discover at least a
trace of oil or gas within the fixed term. Apparently, he would
have no right to such an extension even though he explored diligently during the entire fixed term and his drill was at the time
the fixed term expired within a few feet of a stratum of sand
which would produce abundantly.
In South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass the court attaches great
importance to its holding that the discovery of a mere trace of oil
vests in the lessee the right to produce oil and gas from the premises, whereas prior to such discovery he had only the right to explore. The right to explore for oil and gas is as much a vested
right as the right to produce oil or gas after discovery though the
two rights may differ in character.3 It must be remembered that
we are dealing here with a provision fixing the term and not with
dIn South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, the lessee apparently did not begin to drill
a well until during the latter part of the last year of the ten-year ,term. Thus,
although It had paid a large sum as delay rentals and bad spent a considerable
sum on this well it cannot be Faid to have been diligent. • It paid the rentalv In
order to get the right to postpone operations; so must be taken to have gotten value
for such money. After waiting nine years and a half before beginning to test
the land, why should it be entitled to the right to sink a second well when it
knew it could barely finish one in the remaining time?
3See 25 W. VA. L. Q. 316-320 where the matter is discussed and many cases
are cited.
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a mere condition, a breach of which may give the lessor a right to
forfeit the lease if he so desires. In the first place it is hard to
se how any right to produce oil vests when the only well which
the lessee drilled was substantially a dry hole and would not
produce enough oil to pay the cost of pumping. The court admits this is not production within the meaning of the lease. Why
should a well that produces a few gallons of oil put the lessee in
any better situation than a dry hole? Admitting that a right to
produce does vest on discovery of a trace of oil or gas, why is
there any particular magic in that? It always has been the law
that any interest in land conveyed for a term will terminate in
accordance with the language used in the conveyance and a substantial vested estate terminates just as effectively as a less substantial one. Hence a vested right to produce oil should not be
favored above other vested estates in land. 6
It is submitted that no provision ought to be implied which is
dontrary to the contract of the parties as expressed by their own
language. If a provision is contrary to public, policy or its presence is due to fraud or misrepresentation it might well be declared null and void, but where the language is clear and there
has been no fraud shown it ought not to be nullified by implications contrary thereto. The rule that where the parties have
expressly covered a point there can be no implication ought to
apply here as in other cases.7 In the case under consideration
the parties expressly fixed the term of the lease and when it
should terminate and their contract ought not be changed by the
court. It is certain that the parties when they executed the lease
involved in South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass never contemplated
such an extension of its term as the court made. One cannot help
feeling that the case was decided more on what has sometimes
been termed "fireside equities" than on sound principle. It is
submitted that it would be far better to base a case like South
Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass on the strict construction of the word
produced and thus permit the lessee to proceed to develop the
premises after the end of the fixed term so long as he acted diligently, than to imply a covenant which is contrary to the ordinary meaning of the language of the lease.
6Even a base or terminable fee simple estate is still terminable on the happening
of a contingency unless the Statute of Quia Emptores has prevented this result.
See GRAY, RULs AGAINST PERPLTt rrIES, §§31-42.
7Carper v. United Fuel Gas Co., 78 W. Va. 433, 89 S. E. 12 (1916). Other cases
are collected in 25 W. Va. I. Q. 238, note 13.
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In the principal case the chief ground of decision is that the
lessor by his acts estopped himself from treating the lessee'&
rights under the lease as at an end and, under the circumstances,
the decision of the court is undoubtedly sound on that point.
-J. W. S.

BOOK REVIEWS
F m=AL CODE containing all federal statutes of a general
and public nature now in force. Edited by Uriah Barnes.
Charleston, West Virginia. Virginian Law Book Co. 1919.
pp. civ, 2831.
Barnes' Federal Code, the latest one-volume edition of the
federal statutes, seems to be the most successful effort as yet made
either by Congress or by private enterprise to bring withih moderate compass the enormous amount of federal legislation of a
public nature in force at the time of publication. Congressional
legislation has alwvays been so prolific that as early as 1874 Congress sought to remedy the difficulty encountered in the use of the.
seventeen bulky volumes of Statutes at Large which had been
issued to that date by providing for a thorough revision of th&
federal laws. Pursuant to this Act the first edition of the Revised
Statutes was published in 1875 in one volume, embracing all the.
laws in force to December 1. 1873, as contained in the Statutes
at Large to and including volume 17. In 1878, a second edition of,
the Revised Statutes appeared, containing acts passed by Congress
subsequent to December 1, 1873. In 1891, a Supplement to the
Revised Statutes was published, covering the period from 1874
to 1891 and embracing the laws then in force contained in volumes
18-26 of the Statutes at Large. In 1901, a second volume of the
Supplement was published, covering the period down to 1901 and
embracing the laws contained in volumes 27-31 of the Statutes at
Large. Since 1901 the federal government has published no further Revisions or Supplements. Therefore, the official public statutes of the United States are now contained in the Revised Statutes, one volume, the Supplements to the Revised Statutes, two
volumes, and some ten extremely large volumes of the Statutes at,
Large.
BARNEs'

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1919

5

